1 received royal assent. 2 Bill C-86 significantly changes Canada's immigration law by making it more difficult for refugees to process their claims in Canada. 3 In fact, the amendments empower the Senior Immigration Officer (the front line state agent in the immigration process) to expel a claimant who falls into certain categories created by the law.
The most significant barriers to having one's claim heard in Canada are found in ss. 46.01(1) and 19(1)(c.1)(i) of the amended Act. Section 46.01(1) stipulates that any refugee arriving at Canada's borders through a «safe third country» will automatically be denied a refugee determination hearing in Canada and will be returned to that safe third country. Section 19(1)(c.1)(i) mandates a Senior Immigration Officer (SIO) to exclude from Canada any refugee claimant who has committed a criminal offence in his/her 4 home country. The only restriction on the scope of 19(1)(c.1)(i) is that the offence be recognized in Canada. Moreover, this section operates in conjunction with s. 19(1)(e) which excludes from the Canadian refugee determination process any member of an organization which is reasonably believed to be involved in terrorist activity. This essay will analyze the constitutionality of these provisions in light of the broad protection of human rights enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 5 . Ever since the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration 6 , it has been recognized that Charter rights vest in any individual physically present in Canada. 7 Charter rights thus inure in all refugee claimants on Canadian soil, whether their entry to Canada was legal or not. This essay will argue that Bill C-86 not only violates a refugee claimant's constitutional rights, but also the right guaranteed to refugees by international covenants not to be sent to a place where one's life or security would be threatened.
Attention will not only be focussed on the legal issues involved, but also on the broad array of political interests that operate within the domain of immigration policy. Canada's acceptance of its international responsibility to mitigate the plight of involuntary migrants was recognized in 1987 when the international community awarded the Canadian people the Nansen medal for outstanding achievements on behalf of the world's refugees. 8 In so far as Bill C-86 curtails our international responsibilities, its philosophical underpinnings must be questioned.
The potential Charter ss. 7, 12 or 15 violations created by the safe third country and the prior criminal record provisions shall be separately considered. Subsequently, this essay shall discuss whether either set of provisions can constitute a reasonable limit under section 1. In short, it seems that the effect of the prior criminal record provisions is more likely to violate the Charter than those related to the safe third country. The Charter right most susceptible to violation is the s. 7 guarantee of procedural fairness. It is less clear whether these provisions inflict «cruel and unusual treatment» on a claimant; nevertheless, interesting questions arise whether the fact that they significantly increase the risk of such treatment being inflicted can in and of itself violate section 12. If the impugned sections of Bill C-86 are deemed unconstitutional, this essay proposes that judicial initiative can reword these provisions to give effect to the Canada' s new Immigration Act : (1994) 24 R.D.U.S.
an affront to the Charter and 391 Canada' s collective conscience?
9.
Hansard, 132:163 at 12533, June 22, 1992. 10.
A nascent version of the reforms eventually promulgated in Bill C-86 is contained in Refugee Perspectives, 1987 -88, Refugee Affairs Division, (Ottawa: The Division, 1988 . Bill C-86 was itself first introduced in the summer of 1992, and passed through the three Parliamentary readings fairly quickly, not for want of debate, but rather because the government limited the time available to discuss the proposed legislation. 11.
The Hon. Flora MacDonald, the (November 20, 1984) .
12.
For example, «...the government is also proposing to streamline administrative procedures involved in issuing or renewing documents for visitors, students and returning residents», John Shields, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Employment and Immigration, Hansard, 132:163 at 12505, June 22, 1992. 13 .
Hon. Bernard Valcourt, Minister of Employment and Immigration, in Hansard, 132:180 at 13911, November 24, 1992. rights of refugee claimants as well as to promote the legitimate policy objectives behind the Act.
B. POLITICAL BACKGROUND
«Quite frankly, Canadians are fed up with people trying to beat the system. This Bill addresses that frustration in Canadian society.» 9 --Hon. Doug Lewis, Former Solicitor General
Bill C-86 is the product of many years of discussion, committees and legislative drafting. 10 When the Progressive Conservatives assumed a majority government in 1984, they pledged to revamp Canada' s immigration system.
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Their vision --which animates not only Bill C-86 and regulations made thereto, but also other legislation 12 --rests on three pillars. 13 Firstly, Canada must strive to make a «better selection» of candidates for immigration through closer monitoring of categories and numbers of immigrants. Secondly, the immigration system should be imbued with more stringent control mechanisms to protect Canada' s domestic security and guard against abuse of social services. Lastly, the immigration and refugee determination systems should be streamlined in order to render fair decisions more quickly.
Thus, it is clear that reform of the refugee determination system is not the main priority of Bill C-86. Instead, the focus is on reducing immigration to Canada. Certain regulations already passed under the new Immigration Act serve the dual function of reducing the number as well as diversity of immigrants. The government seeks wealthier and better educated immigrants:
We need] a renewed emphasis on the independent and business class immigrant whose skills, talents and acumen are so necessary to our economic prosperity.»
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In order to attain this goal, the «education regulation» was passed in May 1993. 15 In order to be admitted as an independent immigrant, a claimant must now obtain 70 points out of 100 on the Ministry' s new test. A university degree is worth 15 points, and knowledge of English or French nets an additional 15 points. A candidate without a secondary school degree receives no points; a claimant with no proficiency in either English or French also receives no points.
The scope of who can qualify as a refugee claimant has also been narrowed. Reducing the number of refugees is seen to support the policy goals behind Bill C-86 since refugees generally have less education, English/French skills and financial resources than immigrants from «safe» countries.
When Opposition members 16 suggested that Bill C-86 was unnecessarily harsh, Conservative Ministers often responded that Canadians had to establish «better control over [our] immigration and refugee programs».
17 References were frequently made to international criminals who allegedly enter the country due to the laxness of Canadian immigration requirements. Another popular image was that of the refugee who fraudulently weighs down Canada' s welfare system. 18 Although an open-door immigration policy may once have been acceptable, many proponents of Bill C-86 now feel it is no longer so. Such is the political background to Bill C-86. A discussion of the constitutionality of its refugee determination provisions shall demonstrate that much of the discourse supporting the legislation is flawed. Although there are some legitimate policy objectives (and this essay will try to flesh these out), they are often lost in a sea of rhetoric. The social and economic problems currently plaguing Western societies cannot be blamed on newcomers and refugees. Doing so obfuscates the real issues at hand and reduces the effectiveness of potential solutions.
C. CHARTER ANALYSIS
The relevant sections of the Charter are as follows:
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
11. Any person charged with an offence has the right (d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal; (g) not to be found guilty on account of any act or omission unless, at the time of the act or omission, it constituted an offence under Canadian or international law or was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.
12. Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. 14. A party or witness in any proceedings who does not understand or speak the language in which the proceedings are conducted has the right to the assistance of an interpreter.
15(1). Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
I. THE «SAFE THIRD COUNTRY» PROVISIONS

20.
In the government's view, these legislative amendments will allow the most meritorious claims to proceed as quickly as possible: Refugee Affairs Division, Refugee Perspectives, 1987 -88, (Ottawa: The Division, 1988 the prior criminal record ones) constitute screening devices geared to reducing the number of claims actually heard by the Refugee Division.
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The only exception to s. 46.01(1)(b) is contained in s. 46.01(3)(a) which provides that a person who is in a country solely for the purposes of joining a «connecting flight» to Canada shall not be considered as coming to Canada from that country. The combined effect of these provisions is as follows: if a Convention refugee arrives in Canada after spending one week in Chicago, he will not be able to have his claim determined in Canada but will be sent by the SIO back to the United States 21 unless she is satisfied 22 that the one week stay was for the purposes of a connecting flight.
It is clear that an individual expelled under the safe third country provisions is not being returned to his home country. Instead, he is being sent to face a refugee determination hearing in his first country of arrival, as long as the Canadian government prescribes that country to be «safe» under the definition found in section 114(1)(s). Under s. 114(1)(s), the Minister classifies countries as «safe» using the list of criteria found in s. 114(8). The criteria are as follows: (1) is the country a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 23 ; (2) are its policies and practices in compliance with Article 33 of the Convention, which provides that no claimant is to be sent to a place where her security of the person shall be threatened; and (3) does it possess a progressive human rights record? These, however, are guidelines and not mandatory requirements. 24 Thus, a country can fail to satisfy these criteria yet still be included on the list. The concept of returning a claimant to a «safe» place was enacted to promote international co-operation in the area of refugee matters. While it is true that the preamble to the Geneva Convention 25 encourages a co-ordinated interstate response to the influx of refugees, sending someone to a third country might amount to the first step in returning that person to a dangerous place, namely her home country. Bill C-86 does not preclude this possibility since it does not require the Minister to receive assurances from the safe third country that it will accord the expelled claimant a fair refugee hearing or even a hearing at all. This could violate Article 33 of the Geneva Convention, to which Canada is itself a signatory.
26
SECTION 12
As held in the Motor Vehicle Reference 27 , section 12 is illustrative of section 7 since «cruel and unusual treatment» is an example of a violation of life, liberty and security of the person. 28 Thus, since a statutory instrument may not constitute cruel and unusual treatment yet still violate the liberty and security of a person, it is opportune to first determine whether Bill C-86 infringes s. 12.
This essay shall only discuss whether Bill C-86 occasions cruel and unusual «treatment», not «punishment». The reason for this is clear. The caselaw applying s. 12 to the immigration context has held that a deportation simply does not amount to «punishment». 29 The crux of the matter involves the following question: how can sending someone back to face a refugee determination hearing in a safe third country constitute cruel and unusual treatment? A caveat must be drawn: since the Charter does not have extraterritorial application, it is the act taken by the government of Canada that must be cruel and unusual, not that of a foreign government.
32
The jurisprudence on the constitutionality of Canada' s extradition procedures indicates how s. 12 is to be applied to the actions of foreign governments on individuals benefitting from Charter protection. In R. v. 37 At first blush, Bill C-86 seems to preclude such a situation since any claimant (if at all expelled) will only be returned to a «safe» country. However, a closer examination of the legislation reveals that it in fact significantly increases the risk that legitimate claimants will face just such a deleterious result.
As stipulated by section 114(7), the Minister is required to review the list of «safe» countries every two years and either add or remove countries at her discretion. It is here that a fundamental problem arises. Although the Minister is supposed to monitor the countries on the list, a country may becomes «unsafe» and a claimant sent back to that country before the Minister changes its status. Directly expelling a claimant to such a country could shock the Canadian conscience.
Given the volatile political climate in many countries, such a possibility is far from remote. In fact, it has already come before the courts. In Cheema 38 , a claimant was denied Convention Refugee status. A deportation order was issued against him. The claimant then supplied evidence that the political conditions in his native Punjab had deteriorated from the time of his arrival to Canada to the date on which his claim was rejected. He argued that his application for Convention status should thus be reassessed. The Federal Court ruled that deporting the claimant violated his Charter rights since he was denied a hearing at which to present evidence of these «changing political conditions». The application of section 114 to the eligibility determination is equally heavyhanded, as the claimant is given no opportunity to present any evidence at all whether the country to which he is being directly sent by Canada is actually safe for him. Many third countries may be «safe» for certain classes of refugees yet not for others.
39
Nor is the claimant given a chance to explain why he left that third country in the first place. The Supreme Court, in R. v. Goltz, underscored the fact that any characterization of treatment as cruel or unusual should begin «from the perspective of the person actually subjected to [that treatment]».
40 By precluding the articulation of this perspective, s. 46.01(1) violates Charter section 12.
On another note, the «safe» country may have policies that deny the individual a fair refugee determination hearing. It would «offend the Canadian sense of what is right, fair or just» to send a claimant to a country without assurances that its officials will accord him a fair hearing before returning him Decisions are to be characterized by their effects and consequences. The results of the SIO' s decision are serious: it is not uncommon for denied claimants to be summarily executed upon their forced return to their home countries. In fact, in recent years Canada has returned several claimants to Iran to face death. This decision to return has consequences more serious than any criminal decision in Canada. If we are willing to attribute «penal» status to a Provincial Court Judge' s determinations of fraud, assault and shoplifting, why should we hesitate to ascribe (in the least) the same status to the SIO' s decision? 43.
Cruel and unusual treatment is determined by different approaches depending on the particular context in question. It appears that there is no definitive test as to what constitutes cruel and unusual treatment, just a variety of mutually inclusive standards to be used with an eye to the specific facts involved.
to a potentially dangerous home country. Yet the Act does not require such assurances in order for a country to be deemed «safe». It should be noted that, in the time leading up to the enactment of Bill C-86, the Canadian government attempted to negotiate a «safe-haven» pact with U.S. authorities in order to ensure that any person denied a hearing in Canada and returned to the United States would be guaranteed a hearing by American officials. 41 The negotiations fell through. Until such agreements are actually passed with every country placed on the list in section 114(1)(s), the safe third country provisions shall remain unconstitutional.
Although in Kindler the lack of any assurance that the fugitive would not receive the death penalty was not deemed to violate section 12, the situation of Mr. Kindler is distinguishable from that of refugee claimants. In Kindler the Supreme Court emphasized that administering capital punishment to an individual convicted of murder after a fair trial was not per se cruel and unusual. In the case of the amended Immigration Act, it is difficult to see how our collective conscience would not be shocked by imposing the risk of severe punishment upon a refugee without having had the merits of her claim even discussed.
Given the quasi-penal 42 consequences of the SIO' s decision, an examination of the s. 12 jurisprudence in the criminal context is useful to help define the meaning of «shock the conscience» in immigration matters. In the domestic criminal context, treatment is cruel and unusual if it is so excessive as to outrage standards of decency. 43 Goltz, supra, note 40, at 499. This case involved the decision that a penalty of seven days' imprisonment and a fine of $300.00 for a first conviction for driving while prohibited did not infringe s. 12.
46.
Id.
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A logical extension of the argument would be that procedural concerns ought only to be discussed under s. 7. 48.
In making such an argument, the Ministry would have to circumvent the conclusion of La Forest J. in Kindler, supra, note 33, in which he held at 4 that «...certain punishments imposed following surrender, such as torture, would be so outrageous to the values of the Canadian community that surrender would be unacceptable.» La Forest J. therefore distinguishes capital punishment from torture. Although the logic of such a distinction could be perceived as tenuous, it is found in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. Thus, even on a direct application of Kindler, sending an individual to face torture, even if twiceremoved from Canada, would shock our collective conscience. 44 and has been applied within the context of section 12 by the Supreme Court in Goltz. 45 In Goltz, Gonthier J. adopted the view that, in order to be «outrageous», there must be a gross disproportion between the treatment and what would have been appropriate in the circumstances. 46 Clearly, there is no proportionality between failing to satisfy an administrative requirement unrelated to the actual merits of one' s refugee claim (coming to Canada from a «safe third country») and expulsion from Canada, given that this expulsion could result in torture or even death.
C.J.C. in Miller and Cockriell
This discussion of Bill C-86 uncovers a broader issue: within Charter jurisprudence there has been little discussion of the interplay between s. 12 and procedural guarantees of due process. A persuasive argument can be made that since s. 12 prohibits cruel and unusual treatment per se, it should not matter whether an individual has actually received due process before being sent to face such treatment. 47 Thus, whether Mr. Kindler had a fair trial or not should be simply irrelevant; what is relevant is that it did not violate section 12 to send someone to face the death penalty at the hands of a foreign state. 48 To this end, the Ministry of Immigration could contend that, given Kindler as a precedent, there is no way that s. 46.01(1) violates s. 12. The reply to this is that a closer reading of Kindler reveals that the Supreme Court did not separate s. 12 from due process. 
49.
The extent to which we extend s. 12 protection to refugee claimants in Canada is a difficult issue for, if the protection is of a blanket nature, it could preclude Canadian authorities from ever sending any claimant (no matter how unmeritorious) to any dangerous place. Would this be too onerous for our immigration infrastructure? Perhaps. Yet, on the other hand, the problem with including procedural guarantees in s. 12 is that the scope of the protection against cruel and unusual treatment could be watered down since the door is opened to such treatment being permissible under certain circumstances. 50.
First In fact, if the determinative test for a s. 12 violation is the Kindler «shock the conscience» test, it seems that the Supreme Court has in fact created room for procedural concerns within section 12. For example, if two claimants flee the same dangerous home country and Canadian authorities return one after a thorough hearing reveals him to be a dangerous international criminal, this may not «shock the conscience». Yet, turning away the second claimant without any due process determination as to his bona fides could «shock the conscience» even though both individuals would be subjected to the same treatment at the hands of the state officials of the home country.
49 Bill C-86 thus violates s. 12 since its inadequacy of procedural guarantees heightens the risk that cruel and unusual treatment shall be inflicted on a bona fide claimant.
Moreover, the arguments related to the lack of extraterritorial application of the Charter are shortsighted since they run counter to the spirit of the Charter itself. 50 The Charter' s purpose is to protect individuals from the effects of governmental intervention. 51 A question arises as to whether giving the Charter extraterritorial application imposes Canadian values on other countries. This concern has animated the decisions of the Supreme Court in extradition matters. In Canada v. Schmidt, La Forest J. emphasized that the «judicial process in a foreign country [cannot] be subjected to finicky evaluations against the rules governing the legal process in this country [Canada]». 53 It was held that Charter rights are not universal, but relative to the Canadian context. For the most part, political concerns such as promoting international comity lie at the heart of this interpretative approach.
However, the Charter could retain extraterritorial application when it is called upon to uphold the one set of human rights that are truly universal: those enunciated in the various United Nations Conventions. Every refugee claimant has the right under Article 32 of the Geneva Convention to be expelled to the home country only with due process of the law. 54 Although it is clear that international covenants are not legally binding in Canada, Dickson C.J.C. held in Oakes that those international covenants to which Canada is a signatory help define the scope of Charter rights. 55 In a subsequent decision, Slaight Communications v. Davidson, the Supreme Court held that Canada' s international human rights obligations should inform the interpretation of Charter rights.
56 This caselaw supports the argument that the Geneva Convention' s guarantees could be enforced through the Charter. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, if there are any individuals who are needy of a «large and liberal» interpretation of their Canadian constitutional rights, it is those who do not have any rights at all in their home country.
There is another way in which the safe third country provisions might inflict cruel and unusual treatment on a refugee claimant. In many cases a claimant, even if he has the intention of making a new home in Canada, will be unable to obtain a ticket to Canada from his home country. For example, let us take the case of East European refugees or those fleeing the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. Due to financial or transportation limitations, a claimant might only be able to take a train to Austria even though he has family or friends in Canada and wants to settle here. If he purchases a ticket to Canada in Vienna, he will be unable to have his claim determined in Canada since his original place of entry was Austria, a «safe» country. Moreover, given the fact that «connecting flight» is not defined in the Act, the Senior Immigration Officer will likely use a «common-sense» definition of the term which does not include tickets bought in a foreign country several weeks after the initial date of arrival. 57 If s. 12 is given a broad reading, it could deem it to be cruel or unusual to force a claimant to have her claim adjudged in the first safe country in which she arrives, this often simply being the result of geography and airplane schedules.
58 It must be remembered that refugees are seeking more than just temporary asylum, yet a permanent place where they can build a new life. The «co-ordinated interstate response» policy should not be pushed to the point that it infringes the principle of human dignity which lies at the heart of section 12.
59
Yet another scenario demonstrates the unconstitutionality of Bill C-86. In March and August 1991 thousands of Albanian refugees sailed across the Adriatic Sea to seek asylum in Italy. The numbers were too large for the Italian authorities to handle at once and many claimants had to be forcibly returned without any refugee determination hearing. 60 Although the Albanian government indicated that some of the refugees would be pardoned, Italian authorities knew that the subset of claimants who were completing military service (several hundred) would, upon their return, be charged by a military court with desertion. 61 To this end, when there is a particular glut of refugees to one «safe» country, that country (such as was the case with Italy) might be forced to adopt It is important to bear in mind that ss. 7 and 12 are interconnected and that there is a certain element of overlap between them. Thus, the contingencies discussed in the preceding section can also be used as evidence of a potential section 7 violation. For purposes of brevity they shall not be repeated here.
a stricter admission policy than normal and turn away bona fide claimants such as the Albanians in question. 62 Under the provisions of Bill C-86, any claimant in such a situation, if he were to have left Italy for Canada, would be promptly returned to Italy by the Senior Immigration Officer even if she knew of the situation in Italy. At that point, any such claimants would likely be returned to Albania (a country known for its human rights abuses). 63 The fact that there is no discretion with regards to turning back a claimant opens the door to the possibility that cruel and unusual punishment might ensue from the application of the Act.
In sum, until the international community develops standardized and fair refugee determination policies 64 that will be applied consistently among all safe third countries, the possible risks of refusing someone a merit-based hearing in Canada could be serious enough to violate section 12.
SECTION 7
The scope of «life, liberty and security of the person» is much broader than «cruel and unusual punishment». Even if the impugned sections of the Immigration Act do not violate section 12, they may still infringe section 7.
65
The threshold question is whether the expulsion violates the claimant's «life, liberty and security of the person». In Singh, Wilson J. held that s. 7 «...must encompass freedom from the threat of physical punishment or suffering The geographic patterns of involuntary migration help illustrate how Bill C-86 violates the refugee claimant' s right to life, liberty and security of the person. Fully one-third of all individuals arriving at Canada's borders through safe third countries pass through the United States. To this end, the «safe third country» turnaround provisions will mean that tens of thousands of claimants will be returned to American authorities. 70 Passing through the U.S. is a transportation necessity for refugees arriving to Canada from Latin America. This is cause for concern since the United States has a record of unfair treatment of these refugees. American immigration practices related to Latin America have or return him to the home country. Thus, given that it is politically improbable that Canada would ever declare the U.S. to be an «unsafe» third country 76 , the life and security of those refugees «passing through» the United States is especially threatened. S. 46.01(1) cannot be deemed to infringe s. 7 merely because it deprives a claimant of her security of the person. Section 7 will only be violated if the specific deprivation is not made in accordance with fundamental justice. As outlined by Lamer J. in the Motor Vehicles Reference, fundamental justice has both a substantive and a procedural aspect. 77 It is difficult to conceive how the perfunctory decision of the Senior Immigration Officer as to whether an individual arrived from a «safe» third country for the purposes of a connecting flight satisfies the threshold of procedural fairness mandated by section 7.
It is settled law that fundamental justice is to be contextually defined.
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In Singh it was concluded that the severity of the potential outcome should determine the extent of the procedural protection within the decision-making process. 79 This case is of high precedental value due to the similarity of its facts to potential situations that shall likely emerge under Bill C-86.
In Singh, legislation disentitling a refugee claimant to a full oral hearing in an immigration re-determination proceeding was determined to be inoperative due to its violation of fundamental justice. Wilson J. concluded that, given the seriousness of the outcome of the decision, the claimant must be able to state his 
80.
Singh, supra, note 6, 58 N.R. 1 at 64.
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Singh, supra, note 6. 82.
The officer has the power to look at the arrivant's travel documents, determine whether she came from a «safe third country», decide if the stop was for the purposes of a connecting flight, and immediately order her back. 83.
Section 45(4) of the Immigration Act. 84.
[1984] 2 F.C. 642 at 663.
case as well as know the case he has to meet. 80 The effects of the Senior Immigration Officer's decision are just as far-ranging as those of the Immigration Board in Singh. At best, the claimant will be exposed to a refugee determination hearing in a country in which she has expressly chosen not to settle. At worst, the claimant could be eventually returned to face punishment or death in the home country without any hearing at all. Given the gravity of the consequences, the eligibility determination by the Senior Immigration Officer should be encircled with procedural safeguards to at least allow the claimant to be told the case against him and to be given a fair opportunity to respond. 81 However, the Act does not provide for a hearing, whether oral or written.
82 A section 7 violation is thus triggered.
As explained earlier, the claimant is unable to present any evidence as to why the «safe third country» might not be safe for him. In Singh, it was held that oral hearings are mandatory when there is a serious issue of credibility or when the determination will only be effective if the subject of the determination can present «his side of the story». In the case of a refugee claimant, the «safeness» of the third country is a serious issues of credibility.
Furthermore, in what will likely be one of the most important determinations in the claimant' s life, no provision is made for any right to counsel. Even though the onus of proving that one's claim is eligible to be determined in Canada rests with the applicant 83 , no allowance is made for legal advice to help discharge the burden of proof. In Howard v. Stony Mountain, the Federal Court held that the right to counsel emerges when a person is in a situation where the consequences of a decision are severe and she might not have sufficient «aptitude» to understand and present her case.
84 Such a situation can easily arise in the refugee determination process. However, any argument that Bill C-86' s failure to provide a right to counsel violates s. 7 must, in order to be successful, circumvent the March 1993 Supreme Court decision in Dehghani v. Canada (M.E.I.) . 85 In Dehghani, Iacobucci J. held that fundamental justice does not require that a lawyer be present at a preliminary meeting at which a claimant' s status as a refugee is to be determined. Nevertheless, Iacobucci J. was careful to point out that the absence of a lawyer was only permissible because the meeting in question was nothing more than a «routine information gathering» session and not an actual hearing. The Dehghani situation can therefore be distinguished from situations that would arise under Bill C-86 in which claimants would be without counsel at hearings during which the SIO would have the power to expel them from Canada. In fact, at least one commentator on the Dehghani decision has noted that, under Bill C-86, the absence of legal counsel at the «front-line» hearings could violate s. 7 given the greater magnitude of these hearings than those at issue in Dehghani.
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Even if the Charter may not require the provision of a lawyer at the refugee determination hearing, it does mandate the presence of an interpreter. Despite the fact that many claimants simply do not speak English 87 , the Act does not require the services of an interpreter when these claimants first meet with the SIO. The entire expulsion process could take place without the claimant comprehending any of the procedures nor the Immigration Officer being able to understand anything the claimant has to say. Along with infringing section 7 of the Charter, this specifically denies the section 14 right to an interpreter in any «proceedings». The eligibility decision of the Senior Immigration Officer certainly bears serious enough consequences on the claimant to qualify as a «proceeding» under the Charter. 89 On a related note, the claimant is not entitled to discover the Minister's case. In Singh, Wilson J. held that «...as a matter of fundamental justice, a refugee claimant would be entitled to discovery of the Minister' s case». 90 With Hofer and Singh as precedents, the lack of notice and discovery contribute to a s. 7 violation.
Moreover, there is no sensitivity to the fact that a claimant may simply be unaware of the conditions precedent for entry into Canada. The Ministry assumes claimants to have knowledge of the requirements for admission into the Canadian refugee determination process. This assumption seems unreasonable given the fact that the claimant will be far removed from Canadian public sources before choosing to come here. 91 Although on its own the effects of this assumption might not be sufficient to infringe s. 7, they serve as evidence that, when coupled with the lack of counsel, interpreter, discovery and hearing, establish a Charter violation. 
92.
This seems to be a deliberate omission, since the Immigration Act allows claimants to appeal the decisions of the Convention Refugee Determination Division, yet not the initial decision of the Senior Immigration Officer that determines whether the claimant can address the Division at all. Aside from a judicial review application, the only avenue open to a claimant is to use section 10(c) of the Charter to file a writ of habeas corpus in the court system, which is practically impossible given the fact that the claimant shall likely be detained in an airport (or a border crossing) and will probably have no understanding of the intricacies of the Canadian legal system. The main drawback with a judicial review application is that it requires leave of the court. Researchers have found that, in so far as the Federal Court of Appeal is concerned, there is a great deal of arbitrariness with regard to which applicants are given leave. There are wide variations from judge to judge: I. [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711. This case involved the expulsion of a permanent resident applicant to Italy (his home country) for the reason that he had been convicted of violent crimes in Canada. The deportation occured after his prison sentence in Canada had been served. 94.
It is unclear whether «free access» includes access to the same courts Canadians may have access to. There could be a conflict if «free access» is taken in its literal sense since this means that refugee claimants could acquire access to courts normally inaccessible to Canadians.
95.
Chiarelli, supra, note 93, at 733.
There is no opportunity to appeal the decision of the Senior Immigration Officer.
92 Appeals form a key part of fundamental justice in so far as they enable decisions to be reviewed and new evidence to be adduced. In the decision of the Supreme Court in Chiarelli v. M.E.I., certain sections of the Immigration Act authorizing a deportation were determined to be constitutionally valid. 93 Nevertheless, throughout the entire expulsion process, Mr. Chiarelli was statutorily entitled to numerous discretionary rights to appeal the decision of the Officer. These appeal guarantees were relevant to the constitutionality of the deportation provision. The absence of any such right (even a discretionary one) in Bill C-86 amounts to a denial of fundamental justice to refugee claimants. It also contravenes Article 16 of the Geneva Convention, which provides that a refugee shall have free access to the courts of law on the territory of all signatory states.
94
In Chiarelli, Sopinka J. held that «...the Court must look to the principles and policies underlying immigration law in determining the scope of fundamental justice.» 95 He went on to add that the most fundamental principle of immigration law is that non-citizens do not have an «unqualified right» to enter or remain in the country. 96 Nevertheless, the Immigration Act must not qualify this «right» by means not consonant with fundamental justice. In effect, Sopinka J.'s comments deny the fact that there is an even more basic principle animating immigration policy: no-one shall be sent back to a dangerous place without the benefit of a fairly conducted merit-based hearing. It is United Nations policy that no request for asylum be denied on the simple reason that the applicant could have requested protection in another nation.
97 Bill C-86 contravenes these principles as well as the section 7 and 14 rights of refugee claimants.
SECTION 15
Not every distinction infringes the equality provisions of the Charter. The appropriate test to determine which distinctions do violate section 15 is set out in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia 98 . There are two steps. The distinction must have a differential impact that results in a denial of equal benefit of or equal treatment before or under the law. Secondly, the distinction must involve a prohibited ground of discrimination. 99 There are two types of prohibited grounds: those enumerated in section 15 and those analogous to these enumerated grounds. A thread between these two categories is that they frequently cover groups that have faced historical or structural disadvantage which has, in turn, rendered them «discrete and insular minorities».
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The safe third country provisions create a distinction on the basis of national origin: between refugees from countries with direct access to Canada and those without. Members of the latter group (unless they fit into the connecting flight exception) are denied the protection the Immigration Act accords refugee claimants directly arriving to Canada. 
101.
Moreover, s. 46.01(1) also violates Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, which stipulates that «...the provisions of this Convention [be applied] without discrimination as to country of origin.» Although infringing an international covenant is not determinative of a Charter violation, it is evidence leading to such an end. 102.
In response to the s. 15 challenge, the Ministry could suggest that there is simply no discrimination because claimants from countries not directly linked to Canada can always present a «normal» immigration claim. It is true that, should the claimant have advance knowledge about the safe third country provision, she can apply for immigration status in Canada instead of refugee status once she arrives in the safe third country. However, what if she does not have this knowledge, arrives in Canada and pleads refugee status? Her application would be denied and she would be returned. At that point she cannot switch categories to «normal immigration candidate». In effect, two parallel systems are created: one for immigrants, one for refugees: s. 57(1) of the Immigration Act. Moreover, even if switching were possible, a refugee would likely be disadvantaged by the standards for a successful immigration application which focus on wealth, education and linguistic ability, not the threat of persecution. 103.
For example, as discussed earlier, the Latin American refugees who basically have no choice but to pass through the United States en route to Canada. Doing so opens them up to the unfair practices related to Latin American refugees scholars such as Torlai have found to be present within American refugee policy: consult note 71 et seq. 104.
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 at 1333. Nevertheless, in this case Wilson J. held that «...it would be stretching the imagination to characterize persons accused of one of the crimes listed in s. 427 of the Criminal Code in all the provinces except Alberta as members of a ' discrete and insular minority' », at 1333. To this end, there are still clear limits to which groups can launch Since this distinction involves an enumerated ground, a prima facie s. 15 violation is established.
101 Nevertheless, this violation is further consolidated if it is determined that the group receiving the differential treatment constitutes a discrete and insular minority. 102 In fact, this was a requirement under the original Andrews test. The geography of refugee migration indicates that refugee-nationals of countries not directly linked to Canada are disproportionately most needy of securing asylum in Canada. 103 To this end, the category of persons differentially affected by the safe third country provision constitutes an a priori disadvantaged group.
Nevertheless, even if this category does not qualify as a discrete and insular minority, recent Charter jurisprudence has held that an inability to demonstrate membership in such a minority is not necessarily a bar to establishing a s. 15 violation. For example, in R. v. Turpin and Siddiqui, Wilson J. held that proving the existence of a discrete and insular minority would merely be helpful (as an «analytical tool») to the success of the claim. 
II. THE «PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD» PROVISIONS
Bill C-86 provides that a person is not eligible to have the claim heard by the Refugee Division if he has been determined by an adjudicator to be a person described in s. 19 (1) of having one's prior criminal record go to the substance of one's actual claim, it affects one's admissibility in the entire process.
108
This section is very similar to s. 19(1)(c) of the former Immigration Act which denied permanent residence to individuals claiming immigration status (generally persons from «safe» countries) who have a prior conviction. Given that the present «prior criminal record» provisions affecting immigration claimants and refugees are placed in the same section of the Act and encompass the same wording, the intent of the legislature appears to be that the methodology used to apply the former s. 19(1)(c) is to be used in the application of 19(1)(c.1)(i). If this is the case, the effect of 19(1)(c.1) might constitute cruel and unusual punishment or, at least, violate section 7.
In applying subsection 1(c), courts had developed an equivalency test to evaluate whether a foreign criminal offence should be recognized in Canada.
109
Judicial review also provided for a broad «fairness» duty in this area so that any claimant could have an opportunity to make representations. Nevertheless, despite the existence of these safeguards, immigration authorities have, in recent years, denied permanent residence applications on the basis that the applicant had impersonated a chauffeur in Hong Kong in 1965 110 , that the applicant had stolen the equivalent of $2.50 worth of goods 111 , and that the applicant had killed an animal in 1959 with the intent to steal the carcass. 112 These examples indicate that the Ministry has a low standard of who «constitutes a danger to the public 
113.
On another note, Bill C-86 does not indicate how the adjudicator is to be selected, to whom she is to be accountable, nor whether the SIO qualifies as one.
in Canada». In fact, it appears that once a conviction of any sort is proven, the Minister is satisfied that the claimant constitutes a «danger».
Nevertheless, the identically worded prior criminal record exclusionary provision affects refugee claimants in a much different way than it does immigration claimants. The situation of a refugee is much more desperate than a permanent residence applicant from a safe country since the legal systems of «unsafe» nations are often highly arbitrary. To this end, it is much more tenuous to rely upon convictions from such states. Thus, the judicial equivalency test used in permanent residence applications should certainly not be applied in the context of the eligibility of a refugee. The present equivalency test has two components: (1) a comparison of the precise wording of each statute to determine the essential ingredients of the respective offences; (2) the examination of the evidence before the adjudicator to ascertain whether that evidence is sufficient to establish that the essential ingredients of the offence in Canada had been proven.
Although this test may serve the limited purpose of assessing claims from «safe» countries, its application in the context of refugee claimants will not be sufficient to allow section 19(1)(c.1)(i) to satisfy section 7. This test does not evaluate whether the police actions and judicial procedures in the foreign country conform at all to Canadian norms. No attention is paid to the origins of the evidence used to satisfy the second branch of the equivalency test.
There is thus no requirement that the conviction, in order to be relied upon, must have been arrived at in a manner that comports with (or is even loosely similar to) the Canadian understanding of fundamental justice. No one 113 is mandated to ask whether the initial determination of guilt was made in a fair trial, with right to counsel and the right to cross-examination of the accusers. In this sense, a substantive decision regarding the fate of a refugee will be made in Canada based on the result of a trial that could very well have violated every right the Charter, common law or international criminal Canada' s new Immigration Act : (1994) 115 Such a definition does not recognize the fact that threats of torture or punishment on family members are regularly used in many countries to secure guilty pleas. Large numbers of refugees flee their home countries to escape such governmental heavyhandedness. Yet, when they arrive in Canada, they may be denied a refugee hearing precisely due to criminal records stemming from this same heavyhandedness. Instead of minimizing the damaging consequences a prior criminal record might have, Bill C-86 amplifies them.
Moreover, what about the situation of an individual who has used false documents to escape the home country and come to Canada? In the area of immigration claimants from «safe» countries, the Federal Court has adopted the position that the use of false documents indicates an intention to be subversive in the host country. 116 Technically, it also constitutes fraud, this being an offence under the Criminal Code 117 . If the same standard is applied to refugee claimants, many persons will be turned back simply because the only way for them to actually leave the home country was through falsified documents. Nevertheless, the provision is silent on some critical issues. For example, the SIO appears to have complete discretion whether to solicit the Governor in Council' s opinion as to whether someone is «rehabilitated». Secondly, there is no publication of any criteria on what «rehabilitated» actually means so claimants are denied the chance to effectively prepare for this evaluation.
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With Singh as a precedent, the combined effect of these inadequacies infringes section 7.
The «prior criminal record» provisions affecting permanent residence claimants also contain a «five year waiting period and rehabilitation» exception to the general rule barring such claimants from Canada. Case-law in this area has held that the Governor in Council' s decision in this matter must comport with the principles of fundamental justice, which mandate that he or she have available all the information necessary to make a rational and informed decision.
119 This should include the oral evidence of the applicant provided at a hearing. Hopefully this standard will be read into s. 19(1)(c.1)(i) and its application to refugees. Yet, the overall procedure still remains inadequate if hearings are mandatory to settle the question of rehabilitation yet not to determine whether the prior criminal conviction was fairly obtained in the first place. S. 19(1)(c.1)(i) also touches on the Charter section 11 right to a fair proceeding. Although s. 11 only applies to «persons charged with an offence», if the section is given a liberal interpretation so as to cover a claimant awaiting the quasi-penal 120 decision of the SIO, the possibility that the Act violates s. 11 becomes apparent.
121 More specifically, the «prior criminal record» provisions can be said to infringe the 11(g) right not to be found «guilty» of any offence unless it was an «offence under Canadian law» or «criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.» 122 If there are «procedural guarantees» within the terms «an offence under Canadian law» or «the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations», then rendering an unfavourable decision against a claimant in disregard of these procedural guarantees potentially violates section 11(g). Similarly, section 11(d) However, demonstrating the constitutionality of Bill C-86 may be facilitated by the recent Chiarelli decision, in which Mr. Justice Sopinka emphasized that immigration policy is replete with competing interests and suggested that curial deference be awarded to Parliament in this area. The «deferential approach» often arises when the courts are called upon to evaluate the contents of Canada's foreign policy, of which immigration law is a subset. In Allard and Mellino, La Forest J. emphasized that the courts should exercise extreme caution in interfering with the executive's pre-eminent position in matters of external relations. 129 The point was made that the executive has much greater expertise than the court in the area of foreign affairs. 130 However, is it not the courts that have both the expertise and the duty to ensure that Charter rights be respected? The Ministry affirms two overarching objectives to the safe third country provisions: (1) to give effect to a co-ordinated interstate response to the refugee crisis so as to promote comity among nations 132 ; (2) to expedite and streamline the refugee determination process in order to cut down «abuse» and promote meritorious claims.
i) CO-ORDINATED INTERSTATE APPROACH
Even if the promotion of a co-ordinated interstate approach is a pressing and substantial concern, s. 46.01(1) does not pass the second tier of the Oakes test. The fact that s. 46.01(1) the Act is to be administered in so mechanical a way fails to minimally impair the rights of the refugee claimants as they have no opportunity to show whether the «safe third country» is actually safe for them. Without such an opportunity, refugees risk an arbitrary return to their home country. It is difficult to grasp how this could constitute a «reasonable» limit of a fundamental human right.
The violation of the ss. 7, 12 and 15 rights of refugee claimants could not be justified under the policy objective of «the promotion of comity among nations» since there is no rational connection between the stated objective of the statute and s. 46.01(1). For example, the implementation of the «safe third country» provision shall force the United States to hear even more refugee claims than it presently does. In the past, tens of thousands of claimants (especially from Latin America) used the U.S.A. as a springboard to file a claim in Canada. Since s. 46.01(1) eliminates this possibility for most refugees the number of refugee claimants in the United States shall increase. Such unilateral action on Canada' s part could in fact disturb (and not promote) the political relationship between Canada and the U.S.A.
What if the «home country» refuses to accept the claimant in question? This individual will then become a «refugee in orbit» and no-one will adjudicate his claim. This does not help rationalize an international problem; if anything, it creates a new one. The Metro Toronto Host Program estimates that 60% of refugees arriving at Canada's borders pass through the United States or Western Europe.
133 These individuals will no longer be ex facie entitled to have their claims heard in Canada. Thus, instead of sharing the burden, Bill C-86 shifts more of Canada's responsibilities onto other nations, violating the Geneva Convention's affirmation that «states shall do everything within their power to prevent the refugee problem from becoming a cause of tension between states.» 134 Moreover, it is hardly a co-ordinated interstate approach to place the entire responsibility of accommodating refugees on the country most geographically proximate to them. Along with transportation contingencies, there are many other reasons why refugees might not want to seek asylum in the first 
135.
Thanks to Susan MacDonald, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, for this insight as well as the point about the differential effects of Bill C-86 on women refugees. 136.
The mechanical nature of the exclusionary provision will disproportionately exclude those unable to afford to come to Canada directly from their home country or those unable to prove to the Canadian government that they have the skills or education to support themselves as independent immigrants. Systemic discrimination in many refugee-producing countries has resulted in women having fewer monetary resources and less education than men. 137.
Thanks to Lara Friedlander for this point. 138.
Section 77(1) of the Act. Details of these conditions precedent are found in the Regulations. 139.
It is unclear what this actually means in practice. Its use could in fact become arbitrary. 140.
For example same-sex and common law couples, single persons, and refugees without blood relatives in Canada.
country they flee to. Involuntary migrants seek family and communities who can provide both emotional as well as financial support as they attempt to stabilize their lives. 135 Poorer refugees --often women --will be the most affected by the exclusion provision.
136 By obliging such persons to definitively seek refugee status in the first «safe» country in which they arrive, section 46.01(1) might preclude them from joining the members of their families who have already relocated and settled down in a new home.
In response the Minister could suggest that refugees temporarily in «safe» countries who have family already in Canada would be able to have these family members sponsor them as «family class» immigrants. 137 Unfortunately, the protection offered to these persons by the «family sponsorship» sections of the Immigration Act is far from complete. There are several conditions precedent that, if left unsatisfied, serve as grounds for the Immigration Officer to deny the sponsorship application.
138 For example, the family members in Canada might not be able to undertake the required 5 year commitment to provide all necessary care and maintenance to the claimant. The nominee must also demonstrate that she will be able to «establish herself successfully» in Canada. 139 Only certain family members (spouse, parent, child, siblings, and in some cases more distant relatives) are eligible to sponsor, thereby disadvantaging certain claimants regardless of the urgency of their refugee situation.
140 On a broader scale, it is a non-solution to argue that the refugee determination system can be rolled back because refugees can always use the regular immigration procedures. The regular immigration provisions were not designed to deal with the special needs of refugees.
